To diagnose the vulnerabilities of target system using a remote penetration test approach needs to avoid the modification of the security configuration of the target network. So 
Random Share key Penetration Test Carrier
In order for the polymorphic test code to create a lot of polymorphic worms with different signatures from the original worms after entering the target network, we used different kinds of encryption algorithm to encrypt the test codes in the penetration test unit we developed. The structure of a test code is shown in Figure 1 . The randomly selected secret key which is used each time when the encryption/decryption algorithm runs will be kept inside the created test code. So the polymorphic test codes created through our polymorpher will not be an easily identifiable signature with a decryption program.
Sled Decrypter Secret key E k (testcode) Cram Return Address
Figure 1. Polymorphic Test Code Structure Diagram
Our penetration test unit process is as the following. First, the test code randomly selects an encryption algorithm and a secret key. Then, the sled will be created through random or spectrum analysis. What follows is the replacement of the original sled with the fake bytes. Last, the cram will be set with polymorphic test codes through the frequency that appeared after OP code analysis. Following paragraphs will illustrate the steps of polymorphing:
Step 1:
When our polymorpher receives a test code from the tester, an encryption/decryption function EA/DA = {EA 1 /DA 1 ,EA 2 /DA 2 ,…,EA n /DA n } saved in the polymorpher will be randomly selected and placed inside the test code. An encryption method EA x such as XOR will be selected. And the test code is encrypted by the EA x with randomly created secret key.
Step 2:
Many existing worms such as SQL Slammer, Code-Red, and NIMDA, Sasser [20] and others use NOP to construct the worm's sled. Moreover, it can easily create a signature that allows IDS to use a large amount of NOP to identify worms. Hence, the ADMmutate [12] and Metasploit [15] used Fake NOP to cause the worms' sleds to have fewer signatures. However, the Fake NOP used in ADMmutate [12] and Metasploit [15] was less and can be easily detected by the spectrum analysis due to its unusual instruction distribution. Hence, we propose two methods to create sleds so that we can use all the Fake NOP available in the Intel instruction set. From them, Fake NOP with instruction length of 1 to 5 bytes will be randomly selected to form the sled. Spectrum analysis method is to select Fake NOP in order to make the OP code distribution of the sled close to the normal instruction distribution so that the abnormal OP code distribution will not be detected by the spectrum analysis.
Step 3:
Because the traditional sled has the characteristic of being executable in any entry point, STRIDE [18] used this to detect these types of worms. In order to hide from IDS such as STRIDE, we selected a small number of OP codes and replace them with the bytes that match no instruction codes. There will be an error when the IDS starts to execute from these bytes, so it will be unable to confirm whether the data in the buffer is an executable binary code or not. However, because there are only a small number of instruction code's bytes among the Intel OP code set that do not match, using too many types of these bytes will provide a signature for IDS to detect and identify polymorphic worms. Here we propose two methods to generate the sled: first is to randomly edit the sleds' bytes; the other is to make the byte distribution close to the normal instruction distribution in order to avoid the detection of abnormal OP code distribution from spectrum analysis.
Step 4:
To make the created polymorphic carrier as undetectable as possible, the test code portion has already been encrypted so that it has no signature. However, there is limited room in sled. We used the Cram to adjust the OP code's distribution in the carrier so that the results of the spectrum analysis can be similar to the proportion in the normal packet.
Setting the Carrier's Sled
In order to increase the flexibility of the created sled, we must first organize all the possible Fake NOP instructions that we can use from the target system's instruction sets, and then select our desired instruction set:
OPSet={OP code 1 , OP code 2 , …, OP code n } Each OP code i in the OPSet must meet three requirements: 1. OP code i must be executable; 2. The memory space in the OP code i must have a size limit [23] ; and 3. OP code i can only be immediate operand [13] to allow the test code to execute at any entry point without execution error. Also, we define Instruction code length ||OP code i || as the total length of the OP code i length and the accompanying immediate value. Taking Intel instruction set as an example, there are four kinds of OP code length among the Intel instruction set [13] that meet the three requirements; the four kinds of length are 1, 2, 3, and 5. There are 54 in length 1, 20 in length 2, 18 in length 3, and 15 in length 5. For example, Intel instruction 0x0D is a byte OP followed by 2 or 4 bytes of immediate value instruction. Hence, the instruction length of ||0x0D|| is 3 or 5.
The aim of our method is for the sled not to use NOP or the one-byte NOP equivalents Sled [18] anymore, which are just a sled formed by a one-byte OP code. Since this type of sled would have signatures for IDS, our purpose is to have a seemingly random and irregular distribution on fake NOP, so that it will be difficult for IDS to detect.
We define the sled of the carriers as Sld={Sld 1 , Sld 2 , Sld 3 ,…, Sld ||Sld ∥}. This is a sled with pre-morphed length of ||Sld||. Sld 1 represents the byte closest to the front of the sled. Sld 2 is the second byte and Sld ||Sld ∥ the last. After the test code goes through our polymorpher, its sled will be modified as one with a more complicated content but no regular characteristics, but it is still in the same length.
Sld'={Sld' 1 , Sld' 2 , Sld' 3 ,…, Sld' ||Sld'|| } Similarly, we used Sld' 1 to represent the front byte of the polymorphed sled, while Sld' ||Sld'|| represents the last byte. Because the sled is polymorphed from the original sled, the length of ||Sld|| and ||Sld'|| are equal.
We proposed two methods to create sleds. First is to create sleds using random selection. As for the second method, because the IDS detection of polymorphic worms will judge from the result of spectrum analysis, determine whether the distribution of the OP code in the packet is anomalous and then make a successful detection, we, therefore, take as reference the normal distribution of spectrum analysis to create a sled with a reasonable OP code frequency.
Creating Static Sled
In order for the sleds we create not to provide IDS with signatures, we, respectively, used the two methods mentioned above to create the sleds we will be using. Whereas the results of spectrum analysis may vary due to the different OP code distribution of normal packets, the method of random selection will not be affected by other factors in the process of creating a sled.
Sld j ←OP code i , where OP code i ∈ OPSet and ||OP code i ||≦||Sld||-j+1
When STASLD creates a static sled, we select an OP code with suitable instruction length from the OPSet out of all the bytes in the sled, until each byte in the sled is set completely. In selecting the OP code i , we must meet the condition of instruction length, which has to be shorter than the byte length of the unset OP code. This allows the selected OP code to avoid mistakes and ending at the starting point of the test code. When the end of a sled does not coincide with the start of the test code, this will cause error in execution and failure in attack. Moreover, if the randomly selected instruction in the set sled affects the order of execution, such as JP(0x7A) and LOOP(0xE2), we must confirm that the next byte to be executed is before the test code to avoid failure of the test code. Also, in order to raise the complication of the sled's content that we created, we first selected a sled with an instruction length of 5. To make the index work when directed at these 5 bytes, our algorithm must enable the index to target the four other bytes with successful execution. This can be divided into 2 groups with instruction length 2, and then 3 other groups of instruction with length 1, 2 and 1; there can be even an instruction code using instruction length of 3 and 1.
Figure 2 uses a sled with length of 7 as example. If we randomly select the instruction sub(0x2D) with length of 3 from the instruction set, this means there will be subtraction between the register Eax and the immediate value of the 2 following bytes. Similarly, the remaining 6 bytes randomly select an instruction, e.g. push(0x50), with length of 1. After that, the other 5 bytes will select instructions within the length limit of 5 such as add(0x05), which means the immediate value of the 4 following bytes will be added to the register Eax. The selected instruction code should not exceed the planned length, as we can see we have set up 3 bytes and leave some space for the 4 remaining bytes to select instructions. Thus, instructions with length of 5 cannot be selected. In this case, the order of the length of random selection is 2, such as mov(0xB0), length 3, such as cmp(0x3D), instruction code with length of 2 mov(0xB0), and the byte with length of 1 pop(0x58). Lastly, the allocation of the sled is shown in Figure 2 . Each position is an instruction code, and when the index directed at any of the 7 bytes should execute with error in each position.
Figure 2. STASLD's Intel Instruction Set Formed Sled
In the method of random selection, there is a slight chance that some OP codes may appear too often and then could be detected by IDS. For this reason, we proposed a different approach to sled creation using spectrum analysis results.
Creating Dynamic Sled
Apart from using signatures to identify and detect attacks, IDS also uses statistical analysis to detect attacks with abnormal behavior. For example, some worm detection is based on the analysis of any anomaly in the packet's OP code distribution and thus determines whether it is the shellcode of worms [11] [19] . For the polymorphic worms we create from the polymorpher not to be detected under the IDS' anomaly analysis, we propose a simple approach with spectrum analysis [3] [17] : the proportion of the OP codes in the packet content of the created polymorphic carrier should match the proportion of the bytes of normal packets, in order to evade detection.
The main purpose of dynamic sled is to have the spectrum analysis of the polymorphed bytes resemble the analytical results of the content of the normal network packet, in order to elude detection. To reach such resemblance and take into consideration the difference of the packet contents of normal network traffic in Wenke Lee's Advanced Polymorphic Worms [17] , before we launched the attack, we needed to first calculate and analyze how many times each byte appears in the normal packet of the system's service and its proportion in each packet. We define freq X as the proportion of a byte X in the byte string S in an ordinary packet freq X =Count(X,S)/||S||, 0x00≦X≦0xFF Here, Count(X,S) refers to the times byte X appears in the byte string S in an ordinary packet. In order for the created polymorphic sled to match the normal packet's OP code distribution as much as possible, the proportion of the OP code after polymorphing should be very close to the proportion of the normal volume's bytes. We define sled's OP code proportion of appearance as
From here, the value returned by freq' X shows the byte's current proportion of appearance in the sled. Next, in order to adjust the spectrum analysis result value of the sled we create, we must first calculate the degree of spectrum difference between the polymorphic worm X and the normal packet content.
Δfreq X =freq' X -freq X We define Spec as the degree of total spectrum analysis difference Δfreq X and its corresponding byte set. Based on the value of the Δfreq X , they are arranged in the ascending order from smallest to biggest. For convenient presentation, we use (Diff_1, Δfreq Diff_1 ) to represent the smallest byte and spectrum value of the degree of spectrum difference. Among all, Diff_1 is the byte with least difference and its value of difference is Δfreq Diff_1 . On the other hand, the one with the biggest degree of spectrum difference and byte uses (Diff_n, Δfreq Diff_n ) as notation.
Here, when the byte that matches the Δfreq X does not belong to the OPSet, this will not be included into Spec because we use Spec when setting sleds. If Diff_k does not belong to the OPSet as we setting the sled, it cannot meet our byte requirements for setting the sled.
Furthermore, in order to determine the degree of similarity between the polymorphic worm and the carrier created with the normal network packet content, we need a threshold μ as the basis when we compare the similarity between their spectrum [9] [17]. Thus, we proposed DNYSLD to adjust the frequency of the OP code in the sled.
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The DNYSLD first computes the degree of spectrum difference between the morphed instruction and the normal instruction [17] , and then analyzes the degree of difference of each byte as Δfreq X . The next step is to find the location of the byte with the biggest difference of spectrum analysis (Diff_n). From Spec, the byte with the smallest degree of spectrum difference (Diff_1) will be used for replacement. For example in Figure 3 , the biggest degree of difference Diff_n goes to 0x4A, while 0x6B is one of the smallest. Thus, 0x6B can be used to replace 0x4A. Moreover, because the replacement of bytes will affect the spectrum analysis results of the biggest and smallest bytes, Δfreq 1 and Δfreq n must also be recalculated; the original Spec's (Diff_1, Δfreq Diff_1 ) and (Diff_n, Δfreq Diff_n ) will be moved and inserted into a newly calculated (Diff_1, Δfreq' Diff_1 ) and (Diff_n, Δfreq' Diff_n ) to a suitable position to maintain the Spec's ascending order of size. These actions will repeat until the degree of similarity between the polymorphic instruction and the normal packet reaches the threshold μ [9] [17] . What we need to note is if the selected instruction (Diff_n) affects the execution order, such as JP(0x7A) and LOOP(0xE2), the next byte must not be verified under the scope of the test code so that there will not be a case of unexecutable test code. Because the freq' X will include only the execution code for the sled due to the byte analyzed, when the normal packet includes non-execution code Δfreq X , this will become freq' X =0, making Δfreq X = freq X. . Hence, no matter which execution code we use for replacement, we are still unable to adjust the acute phenomenon. Also, for the data not to be execution codes continuously, causing STRIDE [18] to detect our packaged execution code through anomaly analysis, we proposed the IDS evasion mechanism that changes the non-executable code, so that the IDS cannot accurately detect our penetration test carrier.
Detection Evasion Mechanism for Creating Sled
When the unmatched instruction codes in the byte string are replaced, the original STRIDE algorithm will treat this byte as an instruction for execution. Because this cannot match an instruction code when inserted into the byte, it will not be able to accurately complete the execution of the instruction codes per test unit. Thus, STRIDE algorithm will not take this byte string as worm program code. This method will not affect the original worm attack a lot, because when inserted into an abnormal byte, this will go back to the returned address as its starting point, which will crash the system and then not be able to spread.
Intel(IA-32), HPPA, SPARC, and other instruction sets can be categorized into three: first is the type we select to use to set the sled through the instruction code OPSet; the second is the type of instruction code with no matching execution code OPSet , such as Intel(IA-32) instruction code 0xF1, 0x8z2, 0xD6, etc. [13] ; and the last is the instruction codes that we have not selected out to use but they do exit, such as 0xC9 (LEAVE), 0x9B (WAIT) etc [13] . The OPSet we use contains 5 bytes that meet this criteria.
Because any polymorphic worm or sled can be executed at any bit in Shellcode, this will help IDS detect the all data section part as executable program codes and misjudge them as a worm's Shellcode. Figure 4 shows a complete Sled setup. When STRIDE [18] uses 0x54, 0xB5, 0xB0, or 0x8B as the starting point for execution, these can execute the part of the malicious program. Thus, this can be counted as one of the byte strings that can attack programs. On the other hand, we see in Figure 4 that if we replace one byte 0xB0 with an unmatched OP code byte 0xF1, STRIDE will begin execution in 0x54 and 0xB5 and take 0xF1 as immediate value for normal execution. If execution starts at 0xF1, this can cause system crash and failed execution, but it is because of failed execution that we achieve the deceiving of the detection system.
Because the core's default setting of the IA-32 structure uses 4 bytes as a one-time unit and the biggest value is 16 bytes Because each time it used 16 bytes for replacement and the length of the sled does not always match the 16-byte division equally, when a byte length that has not been replaced yet is less than 16, it will be treated as a complete one and be replaced.
Cram
Since some OP codes are only used in normal packet content, this will be a byte that cannot be set up in the sled to make the results of the spectrum analysis similar to the OP codes distribution of normal traffic. In Figure 6 , we can see that if there is a significant difference between freq' X , the spectrum analysis results of the sled created by DYNSLD, and freq X , the analysis results of the normal network, in the 5 th byte 0x8B, this result cannot be changed by DYNSLD adjustment. Both STASLD and IDS do not even take spectrum analysis into consideration.
Figure 6. DYNSLD Spectrum Analysis Results Diagram
As cram's main purpose is to get the spectrum analysis results of the polymorphic carrier closer to the results of the normal network packet content, the method of setting the cram is as below:
First, we must find the byte Diff_1 with the least difference of spectrum analysis, and then insert this byte into the cram and move or eliminate Spec's (Diff_1, Δfreq Diff_1 ). With the insertion of Diff_1, all the mirrored Δfreq Diff_1 will then change. Thus we must recalculate the value of Δfreq' Diff (Diff_1, Δfreq' Diff_1 ) in order to maintain the Spec's ascending order from smallest to biggest. This step will repeat until the cram is full. Hence, through the increase of the cram, the spectrum analysis results of our polymorphic carrier will be similar to that of normal network packets. In Figure 7 , we can see that through the DYNSLD's adjustment of spectrum analysis, the fluctuation of the irreplaceable byte (0x8B) labeled 5 is very high. This indicates that there is a noticeable difference with the normal packet payload (Figure 6 ). This is a quite obvious signature. However, looking at the dashed line of Δfreq' X , we can find this is the spectrum analysis results after the cram has been set up. The point in Label 5 is already close to 0, while the dashed line of Δfreq' X is very close to the x-axis. This means that its spectrum analysis result is very close to the normal network packet payload, and thus can be used to avoid the detection of IDS [4] .
Experiment and Simulation Results
Because it is necessary for a remote penetration test to execute in the target machine without any compiling, the polymorphic test codes must be an assembly language. To make this happen, the first thing to do is to decide the core of the target computers: Intel (IA32), SPARC, HPPA, etc. In our experiments, we selected the most widely-used core at present as our target type-Intel. Because this type of computer is common for most people, infection would then cause big effect.
Experimental Environment
In order to prove that the method we proposed is workable, we made several experiments and analyzed the results. Our experiment network environment is shown in Figure 8 . To make sure the accuracy and impartiality of the experiment results, the experimental environment is a close network without any external traffic.
Figure 8. Experimental Environment Diagram
We separately conducted experiments on IDS and spectrum analysis: the worm used to hide from the IDS in this experiment is Sasser. In the process, we used original worms not morphed by any tool, polymorphic worms by ADMmutate [12] , and the polymorphic worm we proposed through STASLD, to attack the victim computer. We also set an IDS in the network to test whether our units can successfully penetrate it.
In the other experiment on spectrum analysis, we collected approximately 2000 groups of packets of normal network behavior from the port 135 in accordance with the SMB agreement. We then calculated the proportion of each byte in the connection. We also used a worm that caused great damage to the Internet community in 2003-Blaster 0 [14] for the experiment. Through the STASLD, DNYSLD, and ADMmutate in our units mentioned in this essay, we were able to work out the penetration of the victim computer. In this experiment, each three polymorphic methods attacked 2000 times.
IDS Evasion Experiment
To show the evasion rate of the dynamic carrier, we would first use Snort [16] to monitor all the network packets of the attacker and the victim. If Snort's detection is successful, it can accurately point out that there is a worm attacking the victim computer. However, if Snort fails to detect it, we would use our STRIDE-simulated [18] IDS to detect if it can accurately recognize the worm's attack. If it is still unable to identify the worm, this means that the polymorphic worm successfully hid from the detection of Snort and STRIDE.
Then, we proceed to use the un-morphed Sasser worm, the polymorphed Sasser through ADMmutate and the polymorphed Sasser through the polymorpher we suggested to launch the attacks on our target computer. According to the experiment results in Table 1 , Snort and STRIDE are able to accurately identify the worm of no polymorphism. After we used the common polymorpher ADMmutate [12] proposed by K2 to make some simple morphing of Sasser, the results show that Snort is unable to detect it and needs the support of STRIDE to identify our attack. The main reason of Snort's failed detection is that the content for detection is not the transmitted content from the packet but instead is a fixed message from analyzing network agreement, such as whether there are any apparent signatures that are defined in advance in the requests to establish connection, etc. In the Snort's rules of detection of Sasser, we can easily see from Table 2 that the main content in Snort's detection is the request message in the SMB agreement. The "content:"|05|",byte_test:1, &,16,3,relative" rule indicates that the packet content will show "/05/xx/xx/xx/10", which explains that "xxxxxx10" was added to the register eAX. Hence, we can do some simple adjustment to the content that is to transmit from the packet, such as adding two "05xxxxxx08" or adding and then subtracting or some simple morphing at will. If Snort is to have a security warning message in detection, the packet content must meet all the requirements in the definition. That is why Snort is unable to identify polymorphic worms. If STRIDE is to analyze packet content, we discovered that inside the packet there is a byte string that can execute from any byte and then successfully execute the Shellcode. Through this, Snort can accurately detect the sled, and then determine that this network behavior may be a security warning of a polymorphic worm.
To prove that our proposed method is feasible, we used the same worm Sasser and polymorphed it to attack the same target system, which includes the Snort with the latest rules and the STRIDE we simulated. As we can see from Table 1 that Snort and STRIDE cannot detect any attacks we initiated. As shown in Table 3 , our proposed polymorpher can completely hide from STRIDE's detection. However, because we used a partial byte that does not match the execution codes, when the system selects this byte as the starting point to execute, there will be errors in the execution and a system crash. With a lower frequency, the chance of successful diffusion is higher. And as the number of experiments increases, the number of trials significantly decreases. In the 50 th trial, the success rate decreased by 3%. However, because the number of trials in this experiment was small, the success rate is still not decisive. Yet in the 150 th to 200 th trial, continuous failure in execution cause severe decrease in this rate. There is still a 95% chance of successful execution and continuous diffusion, but the rate is uncertain. We increased the number of trials then, and, in the 300 th and 500 th try, we discovered that the rate was getting stabile and remained at around 94.3%. Our proposed method can steadily execute the test program without affecting the original security conditions with a 95% chance of successful penetration of the target computer's defending system and deliver the testing program.
Spectrum Analysis of a Morphed Test Code
Through the spectrum analysis experiment, we calculated the spectrum analysis of STASLD, DNYSLD, and ADMmutate with normal network behavior. Results are shown in Figure 9 . In Figure 9 (A) we find that in the packet content of normal network behavior and the penetration test, there is obvious difference between the amount of 0x00 and that of other bytes. However, because of the large volume of 0x00, it is difficult to read the diagram. Therefore, we filtered the 0x00 and showed the results in Figure  9 (B). Here we discovered that beside byte group 0x00, the proportion of normal network behavior byte 0x57 is evidently higher than other bytes. In the results of ADMmutate, the byte 0x44 is even higher than the other bytes. Nonetheless, because the proportion of the byte distribution of normal network behavior is not an average distribution, the over-volume of bytes cannot be used as basis for anomaly analysis. In Figure 10 , we showed each method used in the penetration testing and the corresponding spectrum analysis results and their difference with the normal network behavior. Figure 10(A) clearly shows that whichever method we used, byte 0x00 ultimately has the biggest degree of difference. However, this is due to the shorter length of worm sleds without polymorphism, limiting our unit's room for change. Other than byte 0x00, there is an evident difference in the spectrum analysis of the results created by ADMmutate and normal network behavior in the byte 0x44. This can be used as the basis to detect the polymorphic worms created by tools. The difference of the spectrum analysis of STASLD and DNYSLD with the normal network is quite limited, unlike ADMmutate which has a very evident difference for detection. We then filter the byte 0x00 and then analyze the difference between the penetration method of the units and the results of their spectrum analysis with normal network behavior, Figure 10 (B). Hence, we can see that the difference of the spectrum analysis of STASLD with a normal network behavior is not so obvious as that shown in Figure 10(A) . However, the variance of the normal network behavior with the spectrum analysis results is usually within 3%, unlike ADMmutate which has an evident variance for detection. Thus, we can understand that although STASLD's creation of the polymorphic worm is just a simple random method, the performance of the results in the spectrum analysis is good. In order to improve our units, we used DNYSLD to polymorph the worms for better test results. In Figure 10 (B) we can see that the degree of variance for the polymorphic worms' spectral analysis can be lowered to about 1%, better than STASLD. However, the DNYSLD we proposed must focus on all the internet protocols that each type of worms uses and collect huge volumes of the content of normal network behavior for the adjustment of the results of spectrum analysis. For example, Blaster attacks through the SMB agreement's Port 139, we collected the connection details based on the SMB agreement through port 139. From our experiments, we noticed that under the restrictions of the sled's length, other than byte 0x00, STASLD can lower the inaccuracy to about 3%. Moreover, for better outcome, the DNYSLD we proposed can keep the inaccuracy under 1%. Consequently, we know that the methods we proposed, STASLD and DNYSLD alike, still have good results.
Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed schemes that can hide from the current detection and penetration test carrier of polymorphism. Since the current detection methods such as STRIDE [18] , APE [23] and others are mostly based on the premise that there must be a sled that can execute at any position till the end in the packet contents of worms and polymorphic worms. Under such premise, we then proposed to change partial bytes into bytes that do not match any instruction code, sacrificing partial dispersion speed to hide from detection.
In this experiment, we can see that the combination of Snort and other methods like STRIDE will then ensure accurate identification of polymorphic worms, but they are unable to detect the polymorphic worms created by our tools. Although some attacks will cause system crash and are not able to spread, in the experiment we can see that there is still a 94%, even higher, chance of causing the test program to automatically execute itself in the target computer. Therefore, the penetration test unit we proposed has the ability to hide from the current detection methods and carry out the test. Moreover, because of the growing popularity of detection methods that adopt spectrum analysis, we also proposed a cram to adjust the OP code distribution to hide from detection.
